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WHY DOOMSDAY ARGUMENTS ARE BETTER THAN
SIMULATION ARGUMENTS
Alasdair M. Richmond
Abstract
Inspired by anthropic reasoning behind Doomsday arguments,
Nick Bostrom’s Simulation Argument says: people who think
advanced civilisations would run many fully-conscious simulated
minds should also think they’re probably simulated minds them-
selves. However, Bostrom’s conclusions can (and should) be
resisted, especially by sympathisers with Doomsday or anthropic rea-
soning. This paper initially offers a posterior-probabilistic ‘Dooms-
day lottery’ argument against Bostrom’s conclusions. Suggestions
are then offered for deriving anti-simulation conclusions using
weaker assumptions. Anti-simulation arguments herein use more
(epistemically and metaphysically) robust reference classes than
Bostrom’s argument, require no Principles of Indifference, abide
better by the total evidence requirement, and yet use empirically
plausible priors and likelihoods. However, while Doomsday argu-
ments are probabilistically, epistemically and metaphysically stron-
ger than the Simulation Argument, anthropic reasoning can (and
should) refrain from embracing either.
Key words: Simulation Argument, Doomsday Argument, Nick
Bostrom
I. Doomsday Arguments
Doomsday arguments (‘DA’) apply anthropic and Bayesian intu-
itions to our location in history. In particular, DA aim to raise
our personal probability for human extinction, conditional on
our historical birth-rank.1 Supposedly you’re more likely to be
1 See John Leslie, The End of the World. The Science and Ethics of Human Extinction,
(revised 1998 paperback edition, Routledge, London), pp. 187 ff. Bradley Monton’s ‘The
Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank’, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.
53, 2003, pp. 79–82) offers a DA apparently without birth-ranks. However, Darren Bradley
(‘No Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank. A Defense of Bostrom’, Syn-
these, Vol. 144, 2005, pp. 91–100) claims Monton’s (2003) DA needs covert appeal to birth-
rank data after all.
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located where you are (i.e. have the birth-rank you do) if
humanity’s future is short rather than long. If the c. 7 billion people
now alive represent roughly one-tenth of all people there have ever
been, contemporary humans have birth-ranks c. 70 billion. If the
last human birth-rank is a) 71 billion, only 1.4% of birth-ranks
exceed 70 billion. However, if the last human birth-rank is b) 70 tril-
lion, 99.9% of birth-ranks exceed 70 billion. With a), a substantial
fraction of all the people there will ever be live now; with b), we are
unusually early people. DA says: if you want your location to appear
as probable as our evidence allows, do not expect many more
humans to be born. (DA concerns rational expectation – it does not
prophesy unavoidable Doom.)
In Bayesian fashion, DA urges us to favour whichever explana-
tion gives our location greatest conditional probability, and our
present location is supposedly more probable on hypotheses that
make future population smaller rather than larger. The reference-
class DA uses is clear and unexceptionable, comprising simply
human beings. However, before it can change our probabilities
and generate probability-shifts towards Doom, DA needs some
specifications about probability distribution. In particular, DA
must specify i) how different population-hypotheses receive prior
probabilities and ii) how population-hypotheses confer likelihoods
on birth-ranks.
Popular ways to generate DA priors invoke a Principle of Indif-
ference: for example, choose some (big-but-finite) figure for the
largest possible human population, (call it ‘n’), and then give
each population-hypothesis the same prior probability of 1/n. Like-
wise, one might address ii) by allocating any particular birth-rank i
a likelihood of 1/j conditional on total population being j, (where
i j). DA’s conclusions need both prior and likelihood assump-
tions. For example, if priors rise proportionally with the popula-
tion postulated, then prior and likelihood assumptions cancel out
and no overall Bayesian shift conditional on birth-rank occurs.
II. The Simulation Argument
Nick Bostrom’s Simulation Argument (‘SA’) is inspired by DA but
(Bostrom claims) uses more sustainable probabilistic assump-
tions.2 Suppose Doom is deferred or otherwise escaped by many
2 Nick Bostrom, ‘Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?’, Philosophical Quarterly 53,
2003, pp. 243–255.
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civilisations. ‘Posthuman’ civilisations might realise remarkable
technological feats, e.g. running many fully-conscious simulations
of minds (or ‘Sims’ following Brian Weatherson).3 Following
Bostrom (2003), SA says: 1) if you think Sims ever outnumber non-
Sims, you should think you’re probably currently a Sim, and 2) if
humans ever make Sims, we should believe humanity almost cer-
tainly lives in a nested simulation hierarchy, i.e. we are simulated
simulators. Following Bradley and Fitelson’s (2003) reconstruction
of DA,4 we offer posterior-probabilistic and likelihood-ratio argu-
ments for rejecting SA and for preferring DA to SA. If successful,
this attempt is significant not least because Bostrom (2003)
regards SA as more robust and probabilistically economical
than DA.
For argument’s sake, let’s grant SA that: i) Sim-hood is not a
radically sceptical prospect, e.g. Sims are not brains-in-vats or
dupes of Evil Demons, ii) sufficiently complex simulations are
fully-conscious Sims, and iii) all our experiences are compatible
with our Sim-hood. In which case, Bostrom says, our credence for
being a Sim should derive directly from our expected fraction of
Sims:
If we knew that a fraction x of all observers with human-type
experiences live in simulations, and we have no information to
indicate that our own particular experiences are any more or
less likely than other human-type experiences to have
been implemented in vivo rather than in machina then our cre-
dence that we are in a simulation should equal x. (Bostrom
2003: 249)
Bostrom thinks these assumptions suggest one of three things:
1) posthumans are rare, 2) posthumans rarely run Sims, or 3)
we’re probably Sims. (N.B. Bostrom defends only this three-
option disjunction and not any option in particular.) If these
options are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, evidence against
1) and 2) favours 3). Hence Bostrom says our making Sims
would undermine ‘rare posthumans’ and ‘rare Sims’ hypothe-
ses, suggesting our probability of Sim-hood  1:
3 Brian Weatherson, ‘Are You a Sim?’. Philosophical Quarterly, 53, 2003, pp. 425–31.
4 Darren Bradley and B. Fitelson, ‘Monty Hall, Doomsday and Confirmation’, Analysis
63, 2003, pp. 23–31.
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If we do go on to create our own ancestor-simulations, . . . we
would therefore have to conclude that we live in a simulation.
Moreover, we would have to suspect that the posthumans run-
ning our simulation are themselves simulated beings; and their
creators in turn may also be simulated beings. (Bostrom 2003:
253)
Simulation has characteristic structural and epistemic asymme-
tries. Structurally, if Sim-hierarchies grow from a primary ‘base-
ment’, higher levels are causal descendants of lower ones.
Epistemically, Bostrom’s assumptions suggest we should know if
ours is a simulating level but we cannot expect to know if ours is a
simulated level. Bostrom requires these asymmetries, e.g. so you
cannot dismiss your Sim-hood simply because you observe no one
simulating you. Bostrom’s (2003: 254) ‘naturalistic theogony’ even
imagines lower simulation-levels behaving as gods towards the
higher levels they simulate, manipulating higher levels’ local
physics and bestowing rewards/punishments as seems
appropriate.
Simulation hypotheses and SA are independent, and accepting
one need not imply any particular attitude towards the other. Sim-
ulation hypotheses imagine reality to be a (perhaps highly) rami-
fied simulation-structure; SA maintains technologically-optimistic
functionalists face Bostrom’s trilemma. You might think SA sound
but reject your Sim-hood, e.g. because you do not believe posthu-
mans exist. You might think SA unsound but believe you’re a Sim
because you think (e.g.) your simulators have contacted you
directly or you’ve observed a glitch in your local environment’s
programming. Again, Bostrom advocates only SA and its disjunc-
tive trilemma.
III. Anti-Simulation ‘Lottery’
We can make some deductions about our location in simulating
worlds. If we’re Sims, we necessarily inhabit some form of Sim-
hierarchy, whether highly ramified or not. Assuming simulation
does not occur naturally (i.e. without conscious direction),
Sim-hierarchies must grow from a basement level of unsimulated
simulators and end with a ceiling level of unsimulating Sims. Nec-
essarily, the basement level (‘LB’) lacks ancestors, the ceiling level
(‘L1’) lacks descendants and all intermediate levels L2 – LB-1
contain simulating Sims.
ALASDAIR M. RICHMOND4
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Each Sim can occupy only one level in any hierarchy, so any
hypotheses about our level-number will be mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive. In turn, the all-important simulating links
between levels must observe the following conditions:
 Transitivity2 if Lx simulates Ly and Ly simulates Lz, Lx simulates Lz
 Irreflexivity2no level can be its own simulation
 Asymmetry2no two (or more) levels can reciprocally simulate
Given there are minds, reality has at least one level (i.e. j> 0) so if
L1 has finite resources, 1 j<1.5
We do not (and likely cannot) know how many levels may lie
below ours but we do have some relevant data about our hierarchy
position nonetheless: clearly we do not simulate, having ‘neither
sufficiently powerful hardware nor the requisite software to create
conscious minds in computers’, (Bostrom, 2003: 245), and hence
ours is a ‘ceiling’ level. The nature of simulation yields a striking
asymmetry between simulating and unsimulating levels. Simulating
levels predominate if j> 2 but unsimulating levels predominate iff
j5 1, (i.e. no simulation occurs). All else being equal, simulating
5 ‘One consideration that counts against the multi-level hypothesis is that the compu-
tational cost for the basement-level simulators might be prohibitively great’, Bostrom
(2003, p. 253). Later, we argue that anti-simulation arguments need not assume any finite
cap on the number of levels and can still run even if the basement can possess (literally)
infinite resources and run infinitely many levels.
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levels will be more common in (especially highly ramified) simula-
tion hierarchies than unsimulating levels, and the greater the rami-
fication, the more numerous simulating levels will be. Following
Bradley and Fitelson (2003: 25), we construct an anti-hierarchy ‘lot-
tery’ argument by numbering simulation-levels like DA birth-ranks:
 n5 ‘The largest possible level-number’, e.g. three.
 Hj5 ‘Hypothesis: j levels exist in total’, (where j can be any
finite integer 1 and hypotheses Hj are mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive).6
 Li5 ‘Your level is i’, e.g. one.
 Priors: For all j, P(Hj)5 1/n, in this case 1=3.7
 Likelihoods: P(LijHj)5 1/j if i j; P(LijHj)5 0 if i> j.
Two remarks: 1) Bradley and Fitelson (2003) set n at 3 but any
finite n will do. Low n-values are obviously idealisations for DA but
markedly more realistic for SA. (Clearly more than three people
have existed, barring some hyperbolically sceptical hypothesis
obtaining, but our present evidential basis could be exactly the
same with 100, 1 or 0 Sim-levels below ours.) 2) No level-number
can exceed the level-total, e.g. no L5 if only four levels exist. (Cf. the
DA logical constraint that no birth-rank number can exceed that of
the last-born human.) So, our DA-inspired anti-hierarchy ‘lottery’:
PðL1Þ5 ðPðL1jH1Þ3PðH1ÞÞ1 ðPðL1jH2Þ3PðH2ÞÞ
1 ðPðL1jH3Þ3PðH3ÞÞ
[PðL1Þ5 13 1
3
 
1
1
2
3
1
3
 
1
1
3
3
1
3
 
5 11=18  0:61
[PðH2jL1Þ5 ðPðL1jH2Þ3PðH2ÞÞ=PðL1Þ5 1
2
3
1
3
 
0:61  0:27
[PðH1jL1Þ5 ðPðL1jH1Þ3PðH1ÞÞ=PðL1Þ5 13 1
3
 
0:61  0:54
[PðH1jL1Þ > PðH2jL1Þ
6 Note that whereas in Brandon and Fitelson (2003), j numbers all the people there
will ever have been, j herein numbers simulation-levels at a time. As the referee for this
paper suggested, taking level-numbers (rather than times) as our values offers a further
advantage: even if we could somehow know the all-time total of levels would be ‘N’, the
prior for N levels existing already might be only 1/N. If the probability of N levels eventu-
ally existing is 1/N, the prior that N levels already exist equals (1/N)2.
7 Please note this assumption of uniform priors is for illustrative purposes only – see
later on substituting Jeffreys’ priors for equiprobable priors.
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Furthermore, this result generalises so P(HkjLi)>P(HjjLi) for
all finite (i k< j).
If your level is Li, each Hj has its probability shifted by (1/j)/
P(Li). As P(Li) is independent of j, P(HjjLi)/P(Hj) / (1/j).8 The
more levels, the less probable this one becomes. Conditional on
occupying Li in a j-level hierarchy, your location becomes more
probable as j ! i and occupying level Lj is maximally probable iff
j5 1. If you’re unsure how many levels exist, assume no ancestral
levels exists.9
In several respects, SA and DA are evidentially asymmetrical.
DA ‘lotteries’ presuppose ancestor-numbers when assessing our
future prospects; the anti-Simulation ‘lottery’ above presupposes
we lack any (simulated) successors when assessing how many (sim-
ulating) ancestors we might have. While DA needs birth-rank
data, direct evidence of ancestral Sim-levels would make SA redun-
dant. If we somehow learned that five ancestral simulating levels
lay below ours, then we would thereby learn we’re Sims. In this
(obviously counterfactual) case, SA becomes redundant via
increase in data, but then compare the (counterfactual) redun-
dancy of DA if we (somehow) acquired census data from the
future.
Seemingly ours cannot be a simulating level but our ‘lottery’
assumptions suggest our level becomes unlikely if it’s the unsimu-
lating terminus of a simulation-hierarchy. An unsimulating loca-
tion has the highest conditional probability in an unsimulated
world, and such a location is consistent with our best evidence to
date. Anyone who elects to update belief in Sim-hood following
Bostrom should also factor in this counter-balancing DA-style ‘lot-
tery’ argument. Our lacking simulation-technology is relevant to
our likely location. The fewer ancestral levels, the more probable
this location. Prima facie the ‘lottery’ suggests mild probabilistic
assumptions suggest we should not believe we live in a simulation
hierarchy, especially a highly-stratified one. Without contesting
Bostrom’s disjuncts, we need not derive credences for Sim-hood
directly from our expected fraction of Sims. However, the above
8 Paul Bartha and C. Hitchcock, ‘No One Knows the Date or the Hour. An Unortho-
dox Application of Rev. Bayes’s Theorem’. Philosophy of Science (Vol. 66, 1999, Proceedings,
pp. S339–53), p. S344
9 Just to forestall one objection: one could bestow high likelihood on being where
(and who) one is by embracing solipsism, (i.e. because there is literally no one and
nowhere else to be), but this likelihood would come at considerable empirical and (espe-
cially) explanatory cost.
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clearly inherits its prior and likelihood assignments directly from
’lottery’ DA. Can anti-SA ‘lotteries’ be recast with better priors and
likelihoods? Perhaps they can.
IV. Priors and Likelihoods
Following some standard DA presentations, the above uses a uni-
form prior distribution over all hypotheses assigning numbers to
simulation levels. However, DA is adaptable to more nuanced
assignments of priors. For example, we could adopt Jeffreys
(1932) and (1946) ‘uninformed’ prior P(h) / I(h), where ‘I’ is
the Fisher information.10 In developing Gott’s (1993) DA,11 Gott
(1994)12 adopts a Jeffreys ‘vague prior’ whereby P(N)5 k/N,
where N is the all-time total of humans and k is a normalising con-
stant.13 If anything, such prior functions seem better adapted to
SA than DA. Computations have associated costs - see again
Bostrom (2003: 253). Replacing the lottery’s original uniform pri-
ors with Jeffreys’ priors merely strengthens the conclusion that
P(HkjLi)>P(HjjLi) for all finite (i k< j).
Bostrom ultimately charges DA with failure through using a
flawed indifference principle, i.e. one which would treat all birth-
ranks as equiprobable and randomly-selected even though we know
we live c. 2015 CE. Thus DA flouts the total evidence requirement
in discounting data about our current historical position. Instead
Bostrom (2003: 250) advocates a ‘bland indifference principle’
10 See Harold Jeffreys’ ‘On the Theory of Errors and Least Squares’ (Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London, Series A, Vol. 138, 1932, pp. 48–55) and ‘An Invariant Form for the
Prior Probability in Estimation Problems’, (Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series
A, Vol. 186, 1946, pp. 453–461). An anonymous referee makes a further intriguing sugges-
tion here, for which the author is very grateful: combining infinite n with the Jeffreys prior,
section 3’s calculation yields P(H1jL1)5 1/2. So even starting from a tiny prior that no
Sims exist, (i.e. P(H1)  0), adding the information that we are not simulators gives a pos-
terior probability of 0.5 for there being no Sims.
11 J. Richard Gott III, ‘Implications of the Copernican Principle for Our Future Pros-
pects’, Nature, Vol. 363, 1993, pp. 315–9.
12 J. Richard Gott III, ‘Future Prospects Discussed: Gott Replies’, Nature, Vol. 368, 1994,
pp. 108.
13 Cf. ‘Jeffreys’s prior is perhaps the most widely used noninformative prior in Bayesian
analysis. For the binomial regression model, Jeffreys’s prior is attractive because it is
proper under mild conditions and requires no elicitation of hyperparameters whatsoever.
The only requirement is a likelihood function from which the prior is then derived using
Jeffrey’s rule, which is to take the prior distribution to be the determinant of the square
root of the Fisher information matrix’, Ming-Hui Chen, Joseph G. Ibrahim, and Sungduk
Kim, ‘Properties and Implementation of Jeffreys’s Prior in Binomial Regression Models’,
(Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 103, 2008, pp. 1659–1664), p. 1659.
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(‘BIP’), counselling ‘indifference only between hypotheses about
which observer one is, when one has no information about which
of these observers one is’.14 Surely indifference principles, which
seem to conjure numerical probabilities from ignorance, should
be avoided if possible. However, firstly, it’s not clear Bostrom’s
BIP addresses the real difficulty with indifference principles, i.e.
deriving numerical probabilities from distributions.15 Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, rather than rely on some prior jus-
tification of indifference principles, anti-simulation arguments’
prior and likelihood assumptions can be substantially re-cast.
Suppose (for argument’s sake) one takes an austere view of
prior probabilities. Bradley and Fitelson (2003: 27 ff.) offer sugges-
tions for turning posterior-probabilistic DA into confirmation-
theoretic DA, en route eliminating and weakening ‘prior’ and
‘likelihood’ assumptions respectively. Bayes’ Theorem can
translate the posterior-probabilistic question ‘Is P(H1jL1)/
P(H1)>P(H2jL1)/P(H2)?’ into the (logically equivalent) likeli-
hood question ‘Is P(L1jH1)>P(L1jH2)?’. A revised likelihood
assumption that P(LijHj) declines as j increases means P(LijHk)>
P(LijHj) for all (i k< j) but without ‘indifference’ assumptions
or precise numerical likelihood.
V. Branching Hierarchies
Thus far, we’ve not made explicit assumptions about how simula-
tion hierarchies are structured. As reciprocal simulation is ruled
out, hierarchies must either grow linearly or branch upward like
trees. However so far, we’ve numbered levels as though Sim-
hierarchies must be linear, i.e. only one simulated world per simu-
lation level. This assumption seems unduly limiting. For example,
if hierarchies branch, there will necessarily be more simulated
worlds than there are simulation levels.
14 Weatherson (2003, pp. 426 ff.) delineates four interpretations of BIP. He argues only
one of them yields Bostrom’s (2003) conclusions, and then only on dubious assumptions.
But see also Bostrom’s ‘The Simulation Argument, pp. Reply to Weatherson’, Philosophical
Quarterly 55, 2005, pp. 90–97.
15 Cf. ‘I decline to use the Principle of Indifference, not because I disagree with the
equal distribution of probability given the validity of some distribution, but because I deny
the validity of any distribution, of any statistical model, of any statement of probability’,
(A. W. F. Edwards, Likelihood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 56-7,
original emphases).
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The simple bifurcating simulation hierarchy above features four
levels but fifteen worlds – eight of the latter unsimulating and
hence in the majority.
In the branching hierarchy above, living in an unsimulating
location may make you an unusual Sim qua level but rather more
typical qua world, e.g. if most Sims reside in unsimulating worlds.
However, while hierarchies might branch in any number of ways,
we need only assume that occupying any particular world declines
in prior probability or likelihood the more worlds a hierarchy
holds. Let ‘Na’ be ‘this world is number a’ and ‘Wx’ be ‘this hier-
archy holds x worlds in total’, where P(NajWx)5 0 if (a>x).
(For example, in the hierarchy drawn above, x is fifteen.) If
P(NajWx) decreases as x rises, then P(NajWb)>P(NajWx) for all
(a b<x). If probability of location declines with degree of rami-
fication (whether this is taken qua number of levels and/or num-
ber of worlds), then our location is maximally likely iff no other
Sim-worlds or levels exist. We could further simplify by reducing
the relevant hypotheses to two: namely divide our classes of rele-
vant observers into simulates and unsimulates, and thus our levels
into basement and ceiling accordingly.
VI. ‘Prussian’ or ‘English’ Likelihoods?
Our arguments that i) P(LijHk)>P(LijHj) for all (i k< j) and ii)
P(NajWb)>P(NajWx) for all (a b<x) assume locations get less
likely as they grow more numerous. But this could be contested,
e.g. if simulation exhibits economies of scale, then more ramified
hierarchies are more cost-effective.
However, we could streamline our likelihood assumptions still
further: any explanation giving its explanandum likelihood 1 has
the advantage that no higher likelihood can be conferred. Let
ALASDAIR M. RICHMOND10
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‘Hx’ mean ‘One level exists’ (i.e. no simulation) and ‘Hy’ mean
‘More than one level/Sim-world exists’ (i.e. simulation occurs).
Hx confers likelihood 1 on our (unsimulating) location being
unique, so P(L1jHx)5 1, and necessarily P(L1jHy)P(L1jHx). So
at best, Hx and Hy confer identical likelihoods on our being unsi-
mulating even if we assume that overall degree of ramification in no way
diminishes the likelihood of our occupying the particular location that we
do. Why choose Hx? Well, one might retort: why assume degree of
ramification has no impact on likelihood of location? It seems per-
verse to insist that there is no evidential advantage to choosing
Theory X over Theory Y, where both are empirically equivalent
yet X prescribes you have one possible location and Y gives you
an indefinitely large (perhaps infinite) number of supposedly
distinct but indistinguishable (from our perspective) locations.
Better still, Hx is not only empirically adequate but has the
unique advantage that it necessitates our occupying an unsimulat-
ing level. Empirical adequacy and maximising likelihood both
favour Hx. However, if Hy were true, necessarily our level is not
alone. Another empirical advantage of Hx: assuming we observe
no evidence we are being simulated (and SA must make this
assumption on pain of redundancy otherwise), this too is a
datum on which Hx (uniquely) confers likelihood 1. Hence
another significant contrast with DA: short of (very implausibly)
postulating that it is somehow constitutive of our identity that
we have the particular birth-ranks that we do, no population-
hypothesis can possibly confer likelihood 1 on our having birth-
ranks c. 70 billion.
As one more fillip for choosing Hx, consider van Fraassen’s
favouring ‘English’ over ‘Prussian’ conceptions of rationality.16
‘Prussian’ views dismiss everything not expressly permitted as irra-
tional, whereas ‘English’ views think everything not expressly for-
bidden is rational: ‘Van Fraassen opts for the latter view, so
according to him rationality is a permission term and not an obli-
gation term’.17 Even if rationality does not (Prussian-wise) forbid
Hy, no inconsistency or irrationality attends choosing Hx. Any
moment may reveal compelling evidence we live in a Sim-
hierarchy but until then, why accept Hy when Hx is empirically
16 Cf. Bas C. van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989), p. 171.
17 James Ladyman, Igor Douven, Leon Horsten and Bas C. van Fraassen, ‘A Defence
of van Fraassen’s Critique of Abductive Inference’, (Philosophical Quarterly 47, 1997,
pp. 305–21), p. 315.
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adequate? Hy says precisely nothing about why our location is (or
appears) non-simulating, whereas Hx (uniquely) necessitates this
state. If Hx is true then necessarily all observer-moments inhabit
non-simulating locations, (making it rather unsurprising if all our
experiences seem to reside in non-simulating locations). Setting
aside our evidence that we are non-simulators flouts the total evi-
dence requirement.
VII. Sampling Assumptions, Reference Classes
and Other Problems
a) DA often invokes a ‘Self-Sampling Assumption’ (SSA): ‘One
should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of
all observers in one’s reference class’.18 DA critics often invoke
a countervailing ‘Self-Indication Assumption’ (SIA): ‘Given
the fact that you exist, you should (other things equal) favour
hypotheses according to which many observers exist over
hypotheses on which few observers exist’, (Bradley, 2005: 91).
Applying SIA to birth-ranks should yield probability-shifts
towards larger populations which nullify DA-shifts towards
smaller ones.19 However, one might adopt neither SIA
nor SSA, but only the weaker likelihood assumption ‘Observa-
tion O supports hypothesis H1 more than O supports hypo-
thesis H2 (i.e., O favors H1 over H2) if and only if
Pr(OjH1)>Pr(OjH2)’,20 with the rider that H1 is especially
preferable to H2 if 15Pr(OjH1)>Pr(OjH2).
b) While SA uses a version of SSA, Bostrom generally favours
a strengthened SSA, which takes a reference-class of
observer-moments rather than observers.21 Strengthened SSA
says: believe your current observer-moment resides where
you think most observer-moments reside. Hence if you
think most observer-moments are enjoyed by Sims, strength-
ened SSA should suggest you’re probably a Sim.
18 Nick Bostrom and M. C´irkovic´, ‘The Doomsday Argument and the Self-Indication
Assumption. Reply to Olum’, (Philosophical Quarterly 53, 2003, pp. 83–91), p. 84.
19 Bartha & Hitchcock (1999, p. S345) use something like SIA to argue that ‘Doom
Soon’ probability-shifts are off-set by the fact that one’s merely existing at all favours Doom
Later.
20 Elliott Sober, ‘An Empirical Critique of Two Versions of the Doomsday Argument –
Gott’s Line and Leslie’s Wedge’, (Synthese 135, 2003, pp. 415–30), p. 422.
21 See e.g. Nick Bostrom, Anthropic Bias. Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philoso-
phy, Routledge, London, 2002, pp. 159–83.
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Sometimes Bostrom (2002: 181) even goes so far as to define
reference classes using observer-moments: ‘A reference class
definition is a partition of possible observer-moments; each
equivalence class in the partition is the reference class for all
the observer-moments included in it’. Clearly the reference-
classes used herein use Sim-levels or Sim-worlds, and not
observer-moments. Do our reference-classes not simply beg the
question against Bostrom? No: as Bostrom (2003) illustrates,
choosing and assessing reference-classes belongs to the prag-
matics of explanation, and we submit reference-classes are not
obliged to partition over observer-moments.
As an example of explanatory pragmatics here, one might
assess reference-class choices consequentially, i.e. in light of the
inferences they support. (If logic alone will not fix reference
classes for us, the invocation of explanatory and/or pragmatic
considerations in selecting reference classes seems inescap-
able.)22 Bostrom (2002: 73-88) seems to adopt, and thus at least
implicitly sanction, such consequentialist strategies for assessing
reference classes in defending his strengthened SSA. For exam-
ple, Bostrom grants that standard SSA has unpalatable conse-
quences, notably supporting DA, which do not redound to
SSA’s credit. This seems plausible. Bostrom also thinks moving
from observer-partitioned SSA to strengthened (observer-
moment-partitioned) SSA undermines DA, and this result too
seems robust. It’s also plausible that reference classes gain
credit by not licensing DA. (Of course our reference-classes of
Sim-levels or Sim-worlds do not favour DA either.) However,
the mere fact that SA uses reference-classes defined over observ-
ers (or observer-moments) does not support this definition in
itself and indeed constitutes prima facie reason for scepticism
about strengthened SSA. Assessing the plausibility of reference-
classes consequentially, in the light of the inferences they
22 Cf. ‘The correct reference class consists of those instances to which the same causal
factors apply’, (Ronald Pisaturo, ‘Past Longevity as Evidence for the Future’, (Philosophy of
Science Vol. 76, 2009, pp. 73–100), p. 88) and ‘To make the point more generally, if an
ongoing phenomenon is a Poisson process, then the mathematical equivalent of a
uniform-density assumption for a given reference class holds if and only if the value of k
for the given reference class remains constant throughout the past and future’, Ronald
Pisaturo, ‘The Longevity Argument’, 2011, p. 48, available from the author at: http://
www.ronpisaturo.com/ForSale.htm (In Pisaturo’s (2011: 24) notation, ‘k5probability of
doom in the coming year’ – in our arguments, level-numbers occupy the role of years or
other units of time in DA.) Pisaturo (2009) and (2011) passim. both offer pertinent
remarks on reference-class choice in DA.
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support, is a strategy far more likely to undermine SA than to
support it. Note our claim is not that (e.g.) we can safely disre-
gard observer-moment partitions in general, cheerfully assign
observers with identical experiential content to different refer-
ence classes on a whim or regard this reference-class as some-
how generally suspect. Rather, we grant that observer-moment
reference classes may be one of a range of useful choices – how-
ever, we do not accept that such reference-classes are rationally
obligatory and should be adhered to universally regardless
of any other unlikelihoods they may bring in their wake.
Again, reference-class choices can and should be assessed
consequentially.
Bostrom (2002: 183–205) applies strengthened SSA to many
observer-effect problems and claims observer-moment refer-
ence classes offer many advantages. However, other anthropic
arguments (like DA) use salient reference-classes of species,
individuals or spatial locations. Onemight permit only observer-
moment reference classes by fiat but such draconian manoeu-
vres are under-motivated. We submit instead that no (epistemic
or other) norms are broken by invoking reference-classes which
are not partitioned in observer-moments, especially in cases where
an observer-moment partition brings concomitant unlikelihoods in its
wake. Bostrom’s ‘consequentialist’ choice of reference-classes
faces the tu quoque objection that strengthened SSA has its own
counter-intuitive consequences, e.g. supporting SA.
We have some data about our hierarchy location and no rea-
son to thinkmost Sims inhabit unsimulating locations. We need
not show that adopting reference-classes of Sim-levels or Sim-
worlds is compulsory; all we need is that updating beliefs with
Bostrom brings a concomitant unlikelihood of location. Follow-
ing other anthropic arguments, one might adopt a partition of
reference-classes over worlds rather than moments. Tying SA to
one reference-class also narrows its constituency to those who i)
accept functionalism, ii) allow only observer-moment reference-
classes and iii) think most observers inhabit unsimulating
worlds. (Of course assumptions i), ii) and iii) are mutually inde-
pendent.)
Bostrom’s observer-moments reference-class invites questions
about how defining reference-classes relates to the merits of
epistemic internalism and externalism.23 Bostrom’s reference-
23 Bostrom (2003) and Weatherson (2003) consider how externalism affects SA.
ALASDAIR M. RICHMOND14
VC 2016 The Authors Ratio Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
class seems to comprise our doxastic (or phenomenological)
alternates, but then Sims and non-Sims need not be assigned to
the same reference-class merely in virtue of their being indistin-
guishable experientially by us. DA’s reference-class is more
compelling than SA’s, since DA appeals to comparatively
uncontroversial species-membership, whose criteria are biologi-
cally robust and not epistemically contrived. Granted, we might
wonder how far back our species stretches, but sameness of
experiential content is neither necessary nor sufficient for
being human. So one more DA advantage: it needs no particu-
lar stance re: externalism or internalism.
c) One worrying DA feature is that its Bayesian apparatus always
generates probabilistic shifts towards shorter futures, whatever
the present population or its history. Sober (2003) argues like-
lihood judgements must be empirical and case-by-case, hence
no general DA succeeds. In general, conferring high likeli-
hood on explananda does not suffice to make hypotheses
plausible: ‘If I hear noises in my attic, the hypothesis that
there are gremlins bowling up there has a likelihood of unity,
but few of us would say that this hypothesis is very probable’,
(Sober, 2003: 424). Evidence will make some hypotheses (and
hence likelihoods) more plausible than others. We can reject
DA’s principle of giving birth-ranks likelihoods which are
inversely proportional to total population but yet accept the
(Hx) likelihoods in the anti-SA confirmation-theoretic argu-
ment. Likelihoods are no more defeasible or context-
dependent than reference classes, but the (Hx) likelihood is
robustly plausible and evidence-driven.
Many imaginable defeaters could give Sim-hood high prob-
ability, e.g. widespread programming ‘glitches’, communica-
tions from simulators, etc. However, we observe no such
defeaters. Using Bostrom’s reference-class, we might wonder
why most observer-moments occur in apparently unsimulating
worlds. Why would posthumans especially favour unsimulating
Sims? Sober’s (2003) call for empirically plausible likelihoods
supports low likelihoods for unsimulating locations in Sim-
hierarchies.
d) If the arguments herein show that our location has maximal
probability in unramified worlds, might they not also under-
mine other plural-worlds hypotheses besides SA? (E.g. modal
realist, oscillating-cosmos or quantum ‘multiverses’.) No: Sim-
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levels and Sim-hierarchies might resemble worlds and world-
ensembles respectively, but Lewis concrete possibilia, Wheeler
cycles or Everett branches do not exhibit the characteristic
simulation relations – there are no transitive, irreflexive, asym-
metrical evidential and causal links between worlds in the
three latter cases. Without such causal and epistemic features,
no anti-SA argument runs, hence no other world-pluralities
are threatened.
e) The anti-SA ‘lottery’ assumes finite values for n but what if the
basement simulator level is so powerful that Sim-reality is infin-
itely ramified? Would not this destroy any particular numerical
assignment of priors and likelihoods? Even if we reject the
likelihood-ratio argument above (which needs neither numeri-
cal priors nor likelihoods), infinite hierarchies are apt for the
nonstandard measures Bartha and Hitchcock (1999: S352) pro-
pose for infinite-n confirmation-theoretic DA.
f) We’ve assumed present evidence rules out our being simula-
tors. But what if this assumption is wrong and simulation
occurs now? Perhaps our computers harbour undetectable
Sims, so a hierarchy ramifies above us and below. If so, this
level is non-terminal and its number of descendants is
unknown. However, even undetectable Sims would be causal
descendants of this level and the above probabilistic assump-
tions would hold. Contra Bostrom, even our becoming simula-
tors need not increase our credence in being Sims.
g) Finally, one significant objection to DA has no anti-SA ana-
logue: as noted above, the level-numbers we use are those at a
time, not over time. Dieks (2007),24 Pisaturo (2009) and Lewis
(2010)25 argue that DA fails (in part) because it mistakenly
conflates humanity’s total duration and future duration: ‘con-
firmation of smaller total populations is not equivalent to con-
firmation of smaller future populations’, (Lewis 2010: 29).
VIII. Conclusions
For as long as our experience remains neutral over our Sim-hood,
any support for SA must be explanatory and/or confirmatory.
Both Sim hypotheses and Bostrom’s BIP seem coherent but
24 Dennis Dieks, ‘Reasoning About the Future: Doom and Beauty’, Synthese, Vol. 156,
2007, pp. 427–439.
25 Peter Lewis, ‘A Note on the Doomsday Argument’, Analysis, Vol. 70, 2010, pp. 27–30.
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neither SA’s disjunction nor its credence function are compelling.
Relevant data about our location support a probability-shift
against living in a Sim-hierarchy. With present evidence, updating
beliefs toward Sim-hood implies a concomitantly unlikely location
qua Sim-level (or Sim-world). These various hypotheses cannot be
disentangled, since anyone living in a Sim-hierarchy necessarily
occupies some Sim-level/world or other. This conflict undermines
updating beliefs using Bostrom’s BIP alone. Instead one could jus-
tifiably adopt whichever hypothesis gives our unsimulating loca-
tion the highest probability. Given very weak assumptions, if we
would have our location as observers appear probable then cur-
rently we should not believe in any other Sim-levels or Sim-worlds
connected to ours.
Bostrom (2002 passim) convincingly argues that anthropic rea-
soning can help science explain a host of disparate phenomena.
However, if anthropic reasoning remains in disrepute, DA and SA
are partly to blame. DA needs disentangling from SA, and
anthropic arguments from both. At least DA uses far more robust
metaphysical, epistemic and reference-class assumptions than SA.
(So, of the two, it’s far better to choose DA.) However, invoking
the total evidence requirement and/or seeking genuine salience
in reference classes undermines both. Metaphysical gerrymander-
ing can easily yield high probabilities for locations qua observer,
level or world. This is not the place to settle how to choose
reference-classes. However, three constraints might be emphas-
ised: i) similarity in phenomenal content between observers is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for assigning them to a common
reference-class, ii) being embedded in worlds with causally-
different structures can legitimately be a sufficient condition for
assigning observers to different reference-classes, and iii) causal
dissimilarity can legitimately trump phenomenal similarity in
assessing reference-classes. Howsoever phenomenologically similar
simulated and unsimulated worlds are allowed to be, they must
differ profoundly in their physical and modal structure, and
hence straightforwardly assigning their inhabitants to the same
reference-class can (and ought to) be resisted on that basis alone.
However, if we also apply to this problem the sort of consequenti-
alist strategy adopted by Bostrom, we can further argue that SA’s
reference-class currently brings a concomitant striking unlikeli-
hood of location in its wake.
Our best current theories of the world’s causal structure seem
entirely compatible with a short or a long human future. Likewise,
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we’ve no reason yet to think that humans in shorter-future scenar-
ios must belong to different reference-classes from humans in
longer-future ones. Hence still further advantages of DA: Doom
may be imminent or it may be indefinitely deferred, without our
understanding of the world’s nomological structure or our grasp
of what it takes to qualify as human being affected either way.
Probability of location is not such a desideratum that it must be
sought at any metaphysical or epistemic cost, and very unlike DA,
Bostrom’s SA uses an eminently resistible choice of reference-
class. Although not leading to compelling conclusions in their
own right, DA nonetheless enjoy marked advantages in joint prob-
abilistic, explanatory and metaphysical economy and power over
SA, and accepting the latter is by no means an inevitable concomi-
tant of accepting the former. A host of different explanatory con-
siderations from Bayes’ Theorem and the total evidence
requirement to the likelihood principle and ‘permissive’ views of
rationality reinforce our central claim that Doomsday arguments
really are better than Simulation arguments.26
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